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Using a gaze-contingent paradigm, we directly measured observers’ memory capacity for ﬁxated distractor locations during search.
After approximately half of the search objects had been ﬁxated, they were masked and a spatial probe appeared at either a previously
ﬁxated location or a non-ﬁxated location; observers then rated their conﬁdence that the target had appeared at the probed location.
Observers were able to diﬀerentiate the 12 most recently ﬁxated distractor locations from non-ﬁxated locations, but analyses revealed
that these locations were represented fairly coarsely. We conclude that there exists a high-capacity, but low-resolution, memory for a
search path.
 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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What is our memory capacity for where we have looked
during search? Search eﬃciency depends critically on our
capacity to remember previously searched locations. If you
are searching for your car in a crowdedmall parking lot, hav-
ing a high-capacity memory for where you have already
searched will speed up your car search task. Moreover, the
rate of this speed-up will depend on the size of the search
space; redundantly searching the same locationswill bemore
costly in a large parking lot compared to a small parking lot.
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E-mail address: cdickins@udel.edu (C.A. Dickinson).search tasks, that people do have some degree of memory
for where they have looked during search (Aks, Zelinsky,
& Sprott, 2002; Beck, Peterson, Boot, Vomela, & Kramer,
2006; Boot, McCarley, Kramer, & Peterson, 2004; Dickin-
son & Zelinsky, 2005; Gilchrist & Harvey, 2000; Peterson,
Kramer, Wang, Irwin, & McCarley, 2001; however, cf.
Horowitz & Wolfe, 1998, 2001, 2003; Woodman, Vogel, &
Luck, 2001).However,most of thiswork focused onwhether
memory is used (Kristjansson, 2000; Mu¨ller & von Mu¨hle-
nen, 2000; Shore & Klein, 2000) or not used (Horowitz &
Wolfe, 1998, 2001, 2003; Woodman et al., 2001); the ques-
tion of how much information is represented in memory
remains relatively unexplored.
There have been many studies addressing the capacity of
visual short-term memory (VSTM; Alvarez & Cavanagh,
2004; Irwin, 1992, 1996; Irwin & Andrews, 1996; Irwin &
Zelinsky, 2002; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zelinsky & Loschky,
2005), but task diﬀerences prevent generalizations from
these studies to search. For example, in most VSTM tasks
all objects in the display are potential targets, and an
object’s location and identity must be retained in memory
to make a correct response; in most search tasks there is
only one target, and the identities of individual distractors
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simply as ‘‘not the target’’. Those studies that have quanti-
ﬁed memory capacity in the context of search have gener-
ally argued for a very limited memory capacity. Klein
and MacInnes (1999) found evidence for inhibition of
return (IOR) at the two most recently ﬁxated locations dur-
ing search of Where’s Waldo scenes, suggesting that IOR
contributes to search eﬃciency by preventing reinspections
of (at least two) previously searched locations. More
recently, McCarley, Wang, Kramer, Irwin, and Peterson
(2003) found evidence for memory for the last three to four
ﬁxated distractors during a novel search task designed spe-
ciﬁcally to quantify how many objects (i.e., loca-
tion + identity) were retained in VSTM during search. In
their study, search objects were shown sequentially. After
observers had made two ﬁxations, objects were shown
three at a time: the currently ﬁxated object, a yet-to-be ﬁx-
ated object, and a previously ﬁxated object. The probabil-
ity of reﬁxating an object by chance was 50% throughout a
trial; thus, a reﬁxation rate below 50% was taken as evi-
dence for distractor memory. Reﬁxations in this task were
below chance levels for the last three to four objects that
had been ﬁxated during search. Using a very similar para-
digm, Boot et al. (2004), and Beck et al. (2006) recently
reported similar capacity estimates for rejected distrac-
tors—people appear able to remember having searched
the three to four most recently ﬁxated locations.
Although all of these studies are valuable in piecing
together the relationship between memory and search, they
are each limited with regard to specifying a memory capac-
ity for search history. For example, Klein and MacInnes
(1999) only tested the last two ﬁxated locations in the
search path, making it unlikely that they tapped capacity
limits. In contrast, McCarley et al. (2003), Boot et al.
(2004), and Beck et al. (2006) tested much further back into
the observers’ search histories, thereby eliminating this
concern, but the paradigm they used limited the number
of objects that were visible to observers at any one time.
Given that previously inspected objects typically remain
visible in a search task and may enhance memory by serv-
ing as an external memory cue (Dickinson & Zelinsky,
2005), it is conceivable that these studies may have also
underestimated memory capacity. It is also diﬃcult to infer
memory capacity from those studies that have argued for
distractor memory based on a below chance rate of distrac-
tor reﬁxations (Dickinson & Zelinsky, 2005; Gilchrist &
Harvey, 2000; Peterson et al., 2001). Because distractor
reﬁxations are subject to non-memory related inﬂuences,
such as the ‘‘pull’’ of a search guidance signal (Wolfe,
1994; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989) and ‘‘double-check-
ing’’ that might occur following an initial search of a dis-
play (see McCarley et al., 2003, for similar ideas),
estimates of memory obtained from these studies may not
accurately reﬂect our capacity to remember a search
history.
The current experiments attempt to ﬁll these gaps in the
memory in search literature by assessing memory capacityin the context of a standard search task, one in which the
display objects remain visible to the observer throughout
his or her search. To do this, we explicitly tested the obser-
ver’s memory for distractors using a gaze-contingent spa-
tial probe technique. We systematically probed display
locations that were either on or oﬀ the observers’ search
path, asking observers to rate after each trial how conﬁdent
they were that the target had appeared at the probed loca-
tion. This study therefore complements the work of Klein
and MacInnes (1999) and McCarley et al. (2003) by
directly testing observers’ memory for ﬁxated locations in
a search task, as opposed to indirectly estimating memory
using a reﬁxation-based measure. Moreover, we quantiﬁed
memory capacity by varying how far back into observers’
ﬁxation histories we tested, and we did this over a fairly
large range so as to increase the likelihood that we would
tap capacity limits. Our study also builds on the work by
McCarley et al. (2003) in that we used a standard free-view-
ing search task in which all of the display objects were pre-
sented simultaneously and were continuously visually
available to the observer. In addition to object-based or
inhibition-based distractor representations, our paradigm
therefore enables us to assess the contributions from other
forms of memory, such as a memory for the path that was
followed during search.
If there exists a high-capacity memory for the path
followed during search, observers should be able to dis-
criminate ﬁxated locations from non-ﬁxated locations,
which would be expressed by high conﬁdence ratings that
targets did not appear in ﬁxated locations in our task. In
its extreme, meaning a complete representation of a
search history, we would expect these high conﬁdence
ratings for all ﬁxated locations, regardless of how far
back in the search path we tested. However, if this mem-
ory were limited, we would expect that at some point in
observers’ ﬁxation histories they would not be able to
make this discrimination. Moreover, if memory for
search history consists of discrete spatial tags, then evi-
dence for memory should appear in only the three to ﬁve
most recently searched locations, consistent with the
VSTM literature. We will operationally deﬁne a capacity
limit as the point in an observer’s ﬁxation history at
which their conﬁdence ratings for ﬁxated locations do
not diﬀer from their ratings for non-ﬁxated locations.
We will also address the spatial resolution of this form
of memory by examining how observer ratings for non-
ﬁxated objects are inﬂuenced by their proximity to
objects ﬁxated during search.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Ten Stony Brook University students were paid $8/h for
their participation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
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Eye movement and manual response data were collected
using the EyeLink II video-based eye tracking system (SR
Research Ltd.). Eye position was sampled at a rate of
500 Hz, the system’s spatial resolution was 0.2, and
changes in gaze position were available to the computer
running the display program within 8 ms. A Pentium IV
PC running Microsoft Windows XP was used to control
the experiment. Search displays were presented at a screen
resolution of 800 · 600 pixels using a 19 in. ViewSonic
SVGA monitor operating at a refresh rate of 100 Hz.
Observers’ head position and viewing distance of 78 cm
was ﬁxed with a chinrest, and all responses were made with
a standard gamepad controller (Microsoft Sidewinder 1.0).
Search judgments were made with the left and right index-
ﬁnger triggers, trials were initiated with the button oper-
ated by the left thumb, and conﬁdence ratings were made
using the keyboard’s numbered keypad.
The stimuli were low-contrast gray square frames with a
small gap on one side (Fig. 1). The target had a gap either
on the left or the right; the distractors had a gap either on
the top or the bottom. The objects subtended 0.61 · 0.61,
the lines were 0.07 thick, and the gaps were 0.07 wide.
Objects were randomly positioned in the display, with the
exception of the following constraints. There was a 2.87
center-to-center minimum distance between objects, a
2.84 minimum distance from the center of any object to
the center of the display, and a 1.5 minimum distance
from the edge of the display to the center of an object,
making the maximum display size 24 · 17.3. Object
masks were composed of the same line segments and sub-
tended the same visual angle as the search objects.
2.1.3. Procedure and design
A 35-object search display was presented on each trial.
The observer’s task was to indicate whether the target
gap appeared on the left or right by pressing either the left
or right index-ﬁnger trigger on the gamepad. As they
searched, the number, sequence, and locations of ﬁxated
objects were recorded, as is illustrated in Fig. 1a. An object
was tagged as ﬁxated provided that gaze remained within
1.4 of the object’s center for at least 100 ms. If the obser-
ver failed to ﬁnd the target after ﬁxating a prespeciﬁed
number of objects (ranging from 15 to 19), the search dis-
play was replaced by a placeholder display. The place-
holder display consisted of object masks at all of the
search object locations, and a spatial probe (a bright red
box) surrounding one of these locations (Fig. 1b). The spe-
ciﬁc location of the probe depended on whether the trial
was on-probe or oﬀ-probe. In an oﬀ-probe trial, the probed
mask corresponded to an object that was not ﬁxated during
search. In an on-probe trial, the probe appeared around an
object mask corresponding to one of the ﬁxated distractors
in the observer’s search path. To explore the question of
memory capacity using this gaze-contingent paradigm,
for on-probe trials we varied, from 0 to 13, the number
of intervening objects that were ﬁxated between the probedobject and the last object ﬁxated during search. An inter-
vening object value of 0 would mean that the last object ﬁx-
ated was probed, thereby requiring only one object to be
held in memory; an intervening object value of 9 would
mean that the 10th object ﬁxated in the search history
was probed, thereby requiring 10 objects to be held in
memory (for an example of a similar procedure used to
explore VSTM capacity, see Zelinsky & Loschky, 2005).
If the observer found the target, as indicated by a trigger
press response, before the prespeciﬁed number of objects
had been ﬁxated, the placeholder display would be pre-
sented immediately. In this eventuality, the probe for on-
probe trials would be randomly selected from previously
ﬁxated locations; oﬀ-probe trials would not be aﬀected.
In response to the placeholder display, the observer was
asked to rate his or her level of conﬁdence as to whether the
object that had appeared at the probed location was the
target. This rating scale ranged from ‘‘1’’ (high conﬁdence
that the target did not appear at the probed location) to ‘‘9’’
(high conﬁdence that the target did appear there), with a
midpoint rating of ‘‘5’’ indicating ‘‘not sure’’. Observers
were instructed that the purpose of the experiment was to
study how quickly people could ﬁnd targets, and that we
were limiting the amount of time they were given to search
the displays so as to make the task challenging. No empha-
sis was placed on the conﬁdence-judgment task so as to
reduce the likelihood that they would intentionally encode
the locations of ﬁxated objects. Note also that observers
were led to believe, through explicit instruction, that a tar-
get was present on every trial, when in actuality this was
not the case. This ruse proved convincing in spite of the
fact that the display program consistently terminated the
search display (replacing it with the placeholder display)
after approximately half of the display objects had been
searched. Observers attributed their frequent failures to
ﬁnd the target to a brief and time-limited search display;
no observer reported becoming aware that the duration
of the search display depended on their own eye movement
behavior. Moreover, had observers been allowed to ﬁxate
more than half of the display objects, they might have
become biased towards making a ‘‘target was not there’’
response based on the duration of their search (Chun &
Wolfe, 1996).
We manipulated target presence or absence, probe loca-
tion (on-probe or oﬀ-probe), and the number of interven-
ing objects (0–13). There were a total of 810 trials (plus
27 practice) presented in 15 blocks of 54 trials each. Of
these 810 trials, 630 were on-probe and 180 were oﬀ-probe.
The on-probe trials were divided into 210 target-present tri-
als and 420 target-absent trials. There were more target-
absent and on-probe trials compared to target-present
and oﬀ-probe trials so as to accommodate the intervening
object manipulation. Both target-present and target-absent
on-probe trials were equally divided among the14 interven-
ing-object levels, yielding 15 target-present trials and 30
target-absent trials per intervening-object condition. The
180 oﬀ-probe trials were divided into 60 target-present
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Fig. 1. A schematic representation of the search and memory-probe tasks. (a) The search stimuli used in both experiments, with the arrows showing a
representative sequence of ﬁxations. (b) The accompanying placeholder display (Experiment 1 only) showing the intervening object values corresponding
to the sequence of ﬁxations in (a), as well as an example of an on-probe (left, 3-intervening object condition) and an oﬀ-probe (right). Note that the
intervening object values did not actually appear in the placeholder display, and that only one location was probed per trial; two probes are shown so as to
illustrate both on-probe and oﬀ-probe conditions. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of
this paper.)
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lasted 3 h and was completed in two sessions conducted
on separate days.
2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Memory capacity data
Trials on which search-judgment errors were made
were excluded from all analyses. These errors consisted
of two types: correctly responding to the presence of a
target with the wrong response button (e.g., responding
to a right-gapped target with a left trigger press; 1.64%),
and false alarms (0.02%). We also limited our analyses
of search history memory capacity to the 420 target-
absent trials per observer. Observers searching a target-
present display would often ﬁnd the target and terminate
the trial after ﬁxating relatively few objects. Consequently,there might be many cases in the 0 intervening object con-
dition, but relatively few in the 13 intervening object con-
dition. However, the termination of target-absent trials
required the ﬁxation of roughly half of the display
objects, meaning that we could assemble intervening
object conditions consisting of roughly the same number
of cases. Given the relative stability of the target-absent
data across the intervening object manipulation, we there-
fore use these data to derive our estimate of memory
capacity during search. Finally, we conﬁned our analyses
to the objects in the ‘‘memory set’’ (i.e., objects ﬁxated
between the probed object and the last ﬁxated object,
inclusive) that were not reﬁxated during search. Again,
we did this in order to maintain the integrity of our inter-
vening object manipulation, as object reﬁxation would
require restarting the intervening object counter (see also,
Zelinsky & Loschky, 2005).
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judgments, and on-probe judgments for each level of inter-
vening object are shown in Fig. 2a. Returning to our pre-
dictions, memory for search history should be expressed
as higher ‘‘target was not there’’ conﬁdence judgments (rat-
ings 1–4) for on-probes than for oﬀ-probes, with oﬀ-probe
ratings expected to hover around ‘‘not sure’’ (rating 5).
Moreover, if this memory were complete then this diﬀer-
ence should exist for all intervening-object values tested.
However, if memory were limited then at some interven-
ing-object value there should be no diﬀerence between
on-probe judgments and oﬀ-probe judgments. To examine
ﬁrst whether observers were able to broadly discriminate
ﬁxated object locations from non-ﬁxated ones, we com-
pared observers’ mean on-probe judgments (averaged
across all intervening object values) to their mean oﬀ-probe
judgments. Here, memory for ﬁxated locations would be
reﬂected as higher conﬁdence that the target did not appear
at on-probe locations than at oﬀ-probe locations. A depen-
dent-means t test revealed that observers were more conﬁ-
dent that targets did not appear in previously ﬁxatedNumber of Intervening Items
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Fig. 2. Mean ratings indicating conﬁdence that the target appeared (ratings 6–9
being the highest conﬁdence), at a probed location. All error bars represent the
trials, including mean on-probe (i.e., a probe corresponding to the location of a
corresponding to the location of a non-ﬁxated distractor; square marker) rating
objects (circle markers). (b) Oﬀ-probe ratings (target-absent trials) as a funct
conﬁdence ratings for target-present trials on which the target was found, inclu
oﬀ-probe ratings for distractor locations (square marker), and on-probe ratings
objects (circle markers). (d) Oﬀ-probe ratings (target-present trials) as a functi
which the target was found.locations compared to non-ﬁxated ones (2.3 vs. 3.3),
t(9) = 3.50, p < .05, suggesting that they were able to dis-
criminate ﬁxated locations from non-ﬁxated ones in mem-
ory. Clearly, observers were more conﬁdent in their
decisions if they ﬁxated the probed location than if they
did not. It is also clear that mean oﬀ-probe ratings were sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from the scale’s midpoint (as revealed
by a one-sample t test, t(9) = 4.74, p < .05).
To look for evidence of memory limitations, we ana-
lyzed the mean on-probe ratings as a function of the num-
ber of intervening objects using a repeated-measures one-
way ANOVA. This analysis revealed that conﬁdence judg-
ments did decline over the range of intervening objects
tested, F(13,104) = 7.61, p < .05. To determine the speciﬁc
point at which on-probe ratings diﬀered from oﬀ-probe rat-
ings, we conducted post hoc comparisons using dependent-
means t tests and found signiﬁcant diﬀerences (p < .05) for
all levels of intervening objects except for the 12 interven-
ing object condition, t(9) = 2.02, p = .075. If we deﬁne
the point at which on-probe and oﬀ-probe diﬀerences van-
ish as the capacity limit, this ﬁnding suggests that observersDistance from Nearest Fixated Item (deg)
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, with 9 being the highest conﬁdence) or did not appear (ratings 1–4, with 1
standard error of the mean. (a) Mean conﬁdence ratings for target-absent
ﬁxated distractor; diamond marker) ratings, mean oﬀ-probe (i.e., a probe
s, and on-probe ratings as a function of the number of ﬁxated intervening
ion of mean distance from the nearest ﬁxated object location. (c) Mean
ding mean on-probe ratings for target locations (diamond marker), mean
for distractor locations as a function of the number of ﬁxated intervening
on of mean distance from the nearest ﬁxated object location for trials on
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tors in memory during this search task.2.2.2. Reinspection data
Observers were clearly able to remember a large portion
of their search history, but did they use this memory to
improve the eﬃciency of their search? To address this ques-
tion, we examined the pattern of reinspections in this
search task. If memory use is limited to only a handful of
discrete spatial tags, observers should tend to avoid rein-
specting an object after inspecting up to 4–5 other objects,
but distractors visited farther back in the ﬁxation sequence
would not be tagged and should therefore be reinspected
with greater frequency. However, if the memory used by
observers to make their conﬁdence judgments was also
used to guide search away from previously visited distrac-
tors, observers should avoid reinspecting objects even after
10 intervening object inspections. Fig. 3 shows the propor-
tion of target-absent distractor reinspections as a function
of the number of intervening objects inspected during
search. Object reinspections were rare overall. Observers
reinspected one or more of the last 12 ﬁxated objects on
35% of the target-absent trials, and on these trials observers
made an average of only 1.3 reinspections. Of these rein-
spections, the majority (64%) occurred following either
one or two intervening distractor inspections, a pattern
that likely indicates an incomplete processing of the most
recently visited objects (Hooge & Erkelens, 1998). More-
over, the rate of reinspections across the 4–10 intervening
object range was uniformly low and certainly no greater
than the reinspection rate across the 1–4 intervening objectNumber of Intervening Object Inspections
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Fig. 3. The proportion of object reinspections made during the Experi-
ment 1 target-absent trials as a function of the number of intervening
objects inspected. An intervening object is deﬁned as an object visited by
gaze following the inspection of an anchor object; multiple successive
ﬁxations on a given object did not count toward this intervening object
measure. We limited this analysis to the last 12 distractors ﬁxated during
search, the range over which observers were able to discriminate ﬁxated
from non-ﬁxated locations. Note that this 12 distractor range corresponds
to an intervening inspection range of only 10, which would result if a
distractor was inspected, then reinspected after the inspection of 10 other
distractors.range. This pattern suggests that the memory measured by
our conﬁdence-judgment task was at least as eﬀective in
preventing distractor reinspections during search as the
discrete spatial tags previously implicated in search
memory.2.2.3. Memory resolution data
The results of the previous analyses suggest that observ-
ers retained and used a large amount of information
regarding where they had searched; however, these data
do not speak to the resolution of this representation. This
could vary from being very high (e.g., the exact pixel coor-
dinates searched) to very low (e.g., the upper-left
quadrant). To examine this question, we tested whether
oﬀ-probe ratings varied as a function of the distance
between an oﬀ-probe and a ﬁxated object. A high-resolu-
tion memory predicts no eﬀect of this distance on oﬀ-probe
ratings; a lower resolution memory does predict a distance
eﬀect as oﬀ-probes might become confused with nearby dis-
tractors that were ﬁxated during search. For each oﬀ-probe
trial we computed the distance from the probed object to
the nearest ﬁxated object, then accumulated these distances
in 1 bins. Fig. 2b plots these mean oﬀ-probe ratings as a
function of distance from a ﬁxated distractor over the 3–
10 range. Ratings for oﬀ-probes with proximities greater
than 10.5 were collapsed into a separate 11+ degree bin.
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA for the ﬁrst ﬁve
bins1 (3 through 7) revealed that ratings diﬀered as a
function of distance from the nearest ﬁxated distractor,
F(4,36) = 12.14, p < .05. Dependent-means t tests con-
ﬁrmed that this tendency to confuse non-ﬁxated objects
with ﬁxated ones decreased reliably in a graded manner
as the distance to the nearest ﬁxated object increased from
3 to 6 (all ps < .05), a pattern consistent with ﬁndings
showing a graded decrease in IOR with increasing distance
from an attended location (Bennett & Pratt, 2001; Maylor
& Hockey, 1985; Pratt, Adam, & McAuliﬀe, 1998; Pratt,
Spalek, & Bradshaw, 1999; Samuel & Weiner, 2001; Tass-
inari, Aglioti, Chelazzi, Marzi, & Berlucchi, 1987). Taken
together, these data suggest that observers maintained a
fairly low-resolution representation of where they searched.
Moreover, they provide converging evidence for the valid-
ity of our dependent measure; had the ratings in Fig. 2a
been due to a bias to respond ‘‘target was not there’’, they
would not be expected to vary as a function of the oﬀ-
probe’s distance from a ﬁxated distractor.2.2.4. Target-present data
To further determine whether observers were using the
conﬁdence scale correctly, we examined their ratings for
target-present trials on which the target was found (as
indicated by buttonpress). On these trials, if the target’s
location was probed, observers should be highly conﬁdent1 We limited our analyses to the 3–7 range because some observers had
no trials with proximities greater than 7.
2 We included data from only target-absent trials to avoid any
potentially confounding eﬀects of target presence on this measure. In
addition, we excluded observers’ ﬁrst three ﬁxations because these
ﬁxations were not always on objects (see Neider & Zelinsky, 2006, for a
similar observation).
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Experiments 1 and 2.
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larly, if any other location were probed, they should be
equally conﬁdent that the target did not appear at that
location, regardless of where in the observer’s search his-
tory the probed object was ﬁxated (for on-probes) or of
its proximity to a previously ﬁxated object (for oﬀ-
probes). The patterns illustrated in Fig. 2c and d clearly
support these predictions. Consistent with the correct
use of the conﬁdence scales, observers were highly conﬁ-
dent that a probed distractor location did not correspond
to the target when the target was actually found. Like-
wise, observers’ were equally conﬁdent in their judgments
when the target was found and the target location was
probed.
3. Experiment 2
The data from Experiment 1 suggest that observers
maintained a high-capacity, low-resolution memory for
where they had searched, but were they focused on the
search task (as instructed) or were they also attempting
to remember as many ﬁxated locations as possible in
anticipation of the memory test? If our Experiment 1
observers were attempting to encode the locations of
rejected distractors into memory, we might expect to ﬁnd
one or more of the following changes to eye movement
behavior relative to observers who completed the same
search task without an accompanying memory test: (1)
longer ﬁxations on individual objects (reﬂecting a deliber-
ate attempt to encode ﬁxated locations), (2) an increase in
ﬁxation durations over the progression of a trial (possibly
reﬂecting memory rehearsal during search) or (3) more
distractor reﬁxations (reﬂecting an attempt to refresh a
fading working memory representation). Importantly,
the presence of any of these diﬀerences might suggest that
our estimate of search memory capacity from Experiment
1 was artiﬁcially inﬂated. To investigate whether the pres-
ence of a memory test inﬂuenced how observers searched,
we conducted a second experiment in which a new group
of observers completed the Experiment 1 search task
without a subsequent memory test. In addition to the
aforementioned measures, diﬀerences in search behavior
might also be revealed in mean reaction time (RT), error
rates, or number of ﬁxations.
3.1. Methods
Ten students at Stony Brook University participated in
this experiment. All were paid $8/hour and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and none participated in
Experiment 1. All aspects of the stimuli, design, and proce-
dure were identical to Experiment 1, with the exception
that there was no placeholder display presented after the
search display, nor was there a memory-probe task. The
task was now standard visual search in which observers
had to indicate whether a left-gapped or right-gapped tar-
get was present in the display.3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. Oculomotor data
We ﬁrst compared mean search ﬁxation durations (ini-
tial and ﬁnal ﬁxations were not included) for the two
groups to determine if observers ﬁxated individual objects
longer when memory was being tested. A 2 · 2
(group · target presence) mixed factorial ANOVA revealed
no main eﬀect of group (214 vs. 203 ms; Experiment 1 vs.
Experiment 2) or target presence (208 vs. 209 ms; present
vs. absent) and no signiﬁcant interaction between the two
(all ps > .05). We next compared ﬁxation durations for
the two groups as a function of ﬁxation number to deter-
mine if their durations increased as a trial progressed.2
These data are shown in Fig. 4. A 2 · 16 (group · ﬁxation
number) mixed-factorial ANOVA comparing observers’
fourth through nineteenth ﬁxation durations revealed a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect of ﬁxation order, F(15,270) = 3.20, p < .05,
but no signiﬁcant interaction with group,
F(15,270) = 0.98, p > .05. The results of this analysis sug-
gest that observers in Experiment 1 were not taking signif-
icantly more time to encode the locations of rejected
distractors relative to observers who completed only the
search task.
We next compared distractor reinspection rates for the
two groups to further examine whether observers in Exper-
iment 1 might frequently reﬁxate objects in an attempt to
maintain their locations in working memory. We again lim-
ited this analysis to target-absent trials, and collapsed mul-
tiple sequential ﬁxations on the same object (i.e., inside the
same invisible bounding circle) into a single inspection,
as in the previous reinspection analysis. Immediate
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were excluded from this analysis because they might reﬂect
incomplete processing of search objects rather than mem-
ory failure (Hooge & Erkelens, 1998). An independent-
samples t test revealed no diﬀerences in distractor reﬁx-
ation rates between Experiment 1 (.139) and Experiment
2 (.142), t(9) = 0.17, p > .05, suggesting that observers
in Experiment 1 were not using eye movements to rehearse
previously visited locations during search.
Finally, we examined the distributions of saccadic
amplitudes generated during search for the two groups as
a simple way to characterize whether observers were
searching the displays diﬀerently. We included data from
only target-absent trials because there were more saccades
on these trials compared to target-present trials, providing
a more representative sample of gaze behavior. Saccade
amplitudes were collapsed into 1 bins with means ranging
from 3 to 10; saccades with amplitudes greater than 10.5
were collapsed into a single bin. As is shown in Fig. 5,
observers in both experiments showed a fairly strong bias
to shift gaze to nearby objects. However, with regard to
diﬀerences between the Experiment 1 and 2 tasks, these
data, along with the previous analyses, suggest that the
use of a memory test in Experiment 1 was not meaningfully
aﬀecting observers’ oculomotor behavior during search.3.2.2. Manual data
We also compared observers’ mean RTs, error rates,
and proportion of targets found for the two experiments
to examine whether there were any general diﬀerences in
search performance that might suggest an eﬀect of memory
test in Experiment 1. Independent-samples t tests compar-
ing observers’ RTs in the two experiments revealed no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences for either target-present trials (4282 vs.
4489 ms; Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2), t(18) = 0.80,
p > .05, or target-absent trials (5689 vs. 5721 ms; Experi-
ment 1 vs. Experiment 2), t(18) = 0.11, p > .05. An anal-Mean Saccadic Amplitudes (deg)
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Fig. 5. Distributions of saccadic amplitudes for target-absent trials for
observers in Experiments 1 and 2.ysis of observers’ errors in the two experiments also
revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for either responding to
the presence of a target with the wrong button (1.64% vs.
0.61%), t(18) = 1.63, p > .05, or false alarms (0.02% vs.
0.3%), t(18) = 1.52, p > .05, in Experiments 1 and 2,
respectively. Finally, an analysis of the percentage of tar-
gets found also revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences (61%
vs. 53%; Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2), t(18) = 1.44,
p > .05. As in the case of the eye movement analyses, these
analyses suggest that the presence of the memory test did
not meaningfully inﬂuence how observers searched.
4. General discussion
With the debate over whether memory is used during
search reaching an end, the question now turns to how
much memory exists during search. We found that a sub-
stantial proportion of a search history is represented during
the course of a search. Observers were able to discriminate
ﬁxated locations from non-ﬁxated locations, with this abil-
ity extending back to the last 12 locations ﬁxated during
search—far more than would be predicted by estimates of
VSTM capacity (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Irwin, 1992,
1996; Irwin & Andrews, 1996; Irwin & Zelinsky, 2002;
Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zelinsky & Loschky, 2005). Our esti-
mate of memory capacity for searched locations is also
higher than estimates of distractor memory reported in
the memory in search literature (e.g., Klein & MacInnes,
1999; McCarley et al., 2003), and even inconsistent with
a recent study by Peterson, Beck, and Vomela (2007) that
also showed evidence for a high-capacity memory during
search. Their task was designed to examine the relative
contributions of prospective memory (i.e., a search plan)
and retrospective memory (i.e., a search history) to search
behavior. They concluded that both forms of memory con-
tribute to search eﬃciency, and that the prospective form
of memory had a high capacity. However, and in contrast
to our results, they also concluded that the retrospective
memory component had a fairly low capacity, limited to
the four to ﬁve most recently ﬁxated objects.
How do we reconcile our evidence for a high-capacity
memory for search history with the many studies showing
an extremely limited search memory? Although our conclu-
sion for a high-capacity memory is based on positive and
direct evidence and in some sense trumps arguments
against its existence, we do not believe that the search liter-
ature has been overly hasty in concluding for memory lim-
itations. Rather, we adopt a position similar to the one put
forth by Peterson et al. (2007) and suggest that the source
of this discrepancy lies in the type of memory being inves-
tigated. The concept of memory as a spatially discrete
inhibitory tag has dominated the memory in search litera-
ture (e.g., Klein, 1988), and the studies designed to reveal
these tags have consistently produced capacity estimates
in the 3–5 object range, similar to estimates of VSTM
capacity. Based on our data, we believe that there exists
another, higher capacity, form of retrospective memory
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memory for the search process itself, not the things that
were searched.
4.1. Memory for a search path
Having demonstrated that people retain a large amount
of information about where they have searched, and
assuming that capacity limitations on VSTM prevent the
representation of this information as spatially discrete
inhibitory tags, it follows from our predictions that observ-
ers in Experiment 1 were remembering their search paths.
The importance of a search path is being rapidly realized
in the eye movement and search community. In a recent
study by Findlay and Brown (2006), observers had to scan
the objects in a display, but the sequence in which these
objects could be ﬁxated was not constrained by the task
(only the ﬁrst and last objects to be ﬁxated were con-
strained). Despite the free-viewing nature of the task, these
authors reported a high degree of systematicity in observ-
ers’ scanning behavior. Moreover, this systematicity took
one of two forms: observers either adopted a stereotypical
scanning strategy (e.g., scanning left-to-right, top-to-bot-
tom), or they tended to follow a pattern suggested by the
layout of the display objects. For example, if display
objects were arranged in an ‘‘S’’ type conﬁguration, observ-
ers’ gaze might follow the path described by the perceptual
grouping of the objects. In a more traditional search exper-
iment, Gilchrist and Harvey (2006) varied the orderliness
of objects in a 25-object display. Objects were arranged
either in a 5 · 5 grid (yielding a highly organized and sym-
metrical display) or in 25 randomly selected locations from
a 6 · 6 grid (yielding a less organized display) or a 7 · 7
grid (further increasing the degree of disorganization).
They found that the majority of saccades in this task were
horizontal regardless of display organization, but that this
horizontal bias decreased (but did not disappear) as the
regularity of the displays decreased.
The Findlay and Brown (2006) and Gilchrist and Har-
vey (2006) studies demonstrated considerable organization
in the path followed by gaze during a variety of challenging
search and scanning tasks; we build on this work by sug-
gesting that our observers were representing their search
path and using it to make their conﬁdence judgments.
Search paths might be represented in one of two ways.
First, and most intuitively, observers may represent the
actual trajectory followed during search. As shown in
Fig. 4, gaze in our task tended to move between neighbor-
ing objects. If the path connecting these successively
searched locations was then represented (either implicitly
or explicitly) in a holistic or conﬁgural form, this grouped
representation might be used to overcome the object-based
capacity limits imposed by VSTM. Peterson et al. (2001)
proposed a similar form of grouped representation to
explain why their observers reﬁxated distractors only rarely
during their search of 12-item displays. Second, a search
path might be represented algorithmically. Observers mightrepresent where they searched by representing how they
searched—that is, the algorithm used to produce the search
path. The inﬂuence of this form of path memory would
likely increase with the observers’ formation and use of a
consistent search strategy. For example, if observers con-
sistently searched left-to-right and top-to-bottom, they
could then use their memory for this simple search algo-
rithm, their starting search position, and their current
search position to infer whether the probed location fell
on this ‘‘reconstructed’’ search path. Note that this diﬀers
from a trajectory-based representation in that actual
searched locations (other than the starting point and cur-
rent location) need not be included in the path
representation.
Both of these path memory representations can vary in
their level of resolution, thereby enabling either to explain
our evidence for a fairly low-resolution spatial representa-
tion of distractor locations. In the case of a trajectory repre-
sentation, the precise sequence of vectors connecting each
ﬁxated distractor might be grouped to create a high-resolu-
tion representation of the search path. Alternatively, the
path representation might be sparser, perhaps connecting
clusters of objects or gross regions of the display (e.g.,
upper-left! upper-right! middle, etc.). In the case of an
algorithmic representation, algorithms can be constructed
with varying degrees of speciﬁcity. A highly speciﬁc algo-
rithm would have contingencies in place to capture the idio-
syncrasies of irregularly spaced distractors (e.g., ‘‘look right
along the top row, drop down to inspect the oddball item,
shift over to the group of three on the left, etc.’’), thereby
yielding a high-resolution representation of the search path.
Simpler algorithms may not be able to capture such display
irregularities. To the extent that observers used low-resolu-
tion trajectory-based or algorithm-based representations
of space in their path descriptions, confusions should arise
between ﬁxated object locations and nearby non-ﬁxated
object locations, as we observed (see Cohen & Ivry, 1989,
for a similar idea). In future work we will attempt to distin-
guish between these two forms of path representation, as
well as to describe how perceptually separable groups, or
even groups deﬁned by scene semantics (e.g., the spatial lay-
out of furniture in a scene)might also facilitate memory for a
search path and improve search eﬃciency.
Although a search path representation is very diﬀerent
from a discrete inhibitory tag, both representations code
information about distractor locations and are therefore
alternative forms of retrospective search memory. As for
why search might beneﬁt from a memory of a search path,
the answer to this question follows the same logic devel-
oped for inhibitory spatial tags (Klein & MacInnes,
1999). By helping to segregate inspected from uninspected
display objects, memory for a search path would improve
search eﬃciency by reducing the likelihood of revisiting
previously rejected distractors. However, and unlike an
inhibitory tag, the usefulness of a path-based search mem-
ory may depend on a number of factors, such as the sym-
metry or regularity of the displayed search items, the
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direction changes or the frequency with which the path
intersects itself), and the level of resolution that was used
to code the search path. It is also likely that the informa-
tion content of a path representation would be subject to
VSTM capacity limitations, meaning that complex paths
might sometimes be coded coarsely to maximize the
amount of search history that they represent. To the extent
that an observer codes a complex search path using a
coarse spatial representation, the retained information will
be unreliable. Given that less complex paths are easier to
remember (Parmentier, Elford, & Maybery, 2005), simple
or highly regular search paths might also be more available
in memory. Paradoxically, the usefulness of a search path
may therefore increase with its complexity (depending on
the stimulus), but one’s ability to create and retain an accu-
rate representation of the search path may decrease with
path complexity. The advantage of a path-based memory
over inhibitory tags, however, is clear: a path memory
can represent, albeit sometimes coarsely, the locations of
many more distractors inspected during search.
There appears to be no one form of memory available
for use during visual search, and the type of memory ulti-
mately used may depend on the speciﬁc demands of the
search task. When the task makes minimal demands on
memory, a small number of inhibitory tags, whose primary
use is to keep search moving toward new display objects,
may suﬃce. When the task is more memory intensive, as
was the case in our Experiment 1, observers may beneﬁt
by supplementing their inhibition-based memory with a
memory for the search path so as to reach farther back into
their search history. However, a path-based memory is
probably most useful (and easiest to use) when the visual
search environment remains relatively stable. When studies
incorporate display changes into their design (thereby
undermining the value of encoding a path; e.g., Peterson
et al., 2007) or present small subsets of the search stimuli
sequentially over time (thereby making path encoding
more diﬃcult; e.g., Beck et al., 2006; Boot et al., 2004;
McCarley et al., 2003), they may be thwarting the use of
a path memory. Given that search in the real world often
takes place under relatively stable conditions, it is possible
that search makes greater use of a path-based memory than
what was revealed by these studies.3 Moreover, to the
extent that studies have created conditions favorable to a
path memory, it is also possible that path representations
might have contributed, at least in part, to the evidence
for memory reported in the search literature (Aks et al.,
2002; Dickinson & Zelinsky, 2005; Gilchrist & Harvey,
2000; Kristjansson, 2000; Mu¨ller & von Mu¨hlenen, 2000;
Peterson et al., 2001).3 Note that display-change paradigms were used in these studies so as to
creatively test the limits of inhibition-based retrospective memory or to
isolate retrospective memory from prospective memory. It was not the
goal of these studies to investigate memory for a search path.In conclusion, we envision a very ﬂuid relationship
between visual search and memory, one in which the search
process exploits whatever memory representations are
available to best meet the demands of the immediate search
task. The long-term memory literature tells us that half the
battle in ﬁnding evidence for memory involves ﬁnding the
right memory test, and that care should be taken to match
encoding and testing conditions before concluding for a
memory limitation (Tulving, 1983). When we provided
observers with a stable and accurate cue to the locations
of the search objects, they were able to discriminate
inspected from uninspected objects at points in their search
histories that far exceeded traditional estimates of memory
capacity during search.References
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